The difference between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism

Earlier, we spent some time parsing the White House’s new policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the truth is, no matter how explicit President Barack Obama’s expression of strategy is, there are profound disagreements over how that strategy should be implemented.

Obama can talk all he wants about how he hopes to “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return.” Yet the procedure for achieving those goals isn’t all that well defined.

There are really two ways to approach the fight against al-Qaeda: the counterinsurgency (COIN) method, and what many refer to as the counterterrorism (CT) method. At first glance, both terms appear to describe the same thing — which is the trap that the president is in danger of falling into.

Both philosophies overlap to a certain degree, but to paint a starker picture, I think the term “anti-terrorism” is more appropriate instead of CT. What distinguishes antiterrorism (call it “AT,” perhaps) from COIN? AT seeks to limit the effects of terrorism by thwarting attackers and preparing defenses, whereas COIN calls for neutralizing the incentives that encourage the spread of radicalism.

Recent U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has featured an increase in the use of UAV attacks and small-team strike forces killing groups of suspected insurgents. That’s a short-term strategy at best. Think of it this way: CT is best used as a tactic, not a strategy. Meanwhile, COIN is best used as a strategy, not a tactic. Put them together, and what should happen is the use of offensive tactics in the larger context of a campaign that seeks to disincentivize radicalism.

Trouble is, not enough people realize the difference between each approach.

Nervy arguments, indeed

Thomas Ricks’ “The Best Defense” blog highlights new, “nervy” arguments made by Colin Gray. The article, which appeared in the latest issue of Parameters (the U.S. Army War College’s quarterly magazine) claims the following:

1. A war between the U.S. and China is “quite likely.”
2. People fret about terrorism the same way that Chicken Little worried about the sky falling. “Compared to interstate war, terrorism … is a minor menace.”
3. “NATO-Russian relations are an accident waiting to happen.”

Gutsy indeed. I think Gray is wrong on all counts. Maybe I’m overly idealistic, but I just can’t see it happening. Yes, China’s growing cyberwarfare capabilities are a threat to U.S. security, and the two countries differ over issues of development and human rights. But I’m not convinced those differences outweigh our similarities (read: both countries just want to get rich). China’s politics may differ from America’s, but that’s not to say they’re necessarily in direct competition.

John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, one of the nation’s foremost counterinsurgency thinkers and a senior fellow at CNAS, has argued that the U.S. military has given up only about three percent of its conventional warfighting capability — for a 300 percent increase in its capacity to fight unconventional wars. Even if interstate war is really more important than low-intensity conflict, the U.S. is still more than prepared for a conventional fight. And the payoff we’ve had from redirecting our resources to learn about unconventional warfare have been massive, enough to make them a valuable pursuit in themselves.

NATO’s recent olive branch extended to Russia suggests relations are improving, not worsening. Despite the historically tense ties between the alliance and Moscow, I don’t think a Russia-NATO partnership is out of the question. If NATO can get Russia to become a net security provider instead of a security liability (maybe even bring Russia on board as a member!) that will mean huge gains for European and Asian security. And that would be a bonus for NATO, who’s looking to justify its relevance in the post-Cold War age. A bonus, too, for Russia — they get to be part of the club that all the popular countries are in. Everybody wins.

Who’s really in control of the situation in India?

This is not a good sign. More evidence that India is allowing the country’s panic to fully determine the government’s response to terrorism. I can’t help but agree with Foreign Policy on this one:

It’s amazing how quickly India appears to be falling into the terrorists’ trap…. Cranking up the pressure on Pakistan may fit the public mood in India—and it may be smart politics for Singh and his ruling Congress Party—but it is folly as policy.

Mumbai: India’s 9/11? Not so fast

The IHT ran a heartfelt piece today about the recent extremist attacks in Mumbai, India. It’s worth noting because it affects the reader on a number of levels. For one, it gives a certain amount of insight into the collective Indian psyche in the aftermath of the attacks. For another, it tries to categorize the incident, to digest it in terms of the broader strategic realities that now face India’s leadership.

The article hits a lot of nails on the head. It’s passionate in the way it captures the emotion of the attackers, the victims and the onlookers. It asks the right questions, particularly about the Indian government’s response to the attacks and whether it was strong enough. And it was moving, which itself seems to count for a great deal in the wake of an attack like this.

Source: http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2008/11/28/mumbaielite460.jpg

But the article is also in danger of responding to the Mumbai hostage crisis in the wrong way. It risks making the same mistakes the U.S. made on September 12, 2001. By dramatizing the incident, by raising the notion that the crisis somehow ushers in an entirely new age of history (“the uniqueness of now”), the author paves the way for a public response that could spiral out of control, losing all sense of proportion. This is just the response that the U.S. had after the Twin Towers fell. Americans felt insecure, which was natural. But they attributed the 9/11 attacks to, as President George W. Bush said, “enemies of freedom” who were irrational and desired only the destruction of the U.S. and its way of life. It was an explanation that seemed to fit the scale and surprising nature of the act.

This epic vision of terrorism is misguided. Not only does it play to the terrorists’ desires, who would like nothing more than to be recognized as the greatest threat to the world’s only superpower; not only has terrorism been proven, time and again, to be a rational tactic employed by completely ordinary individuals; it also implicitly calls for a massive retaliatory response. If terrorism poses such a grave threat, then resistance is absolutely necessary. And to ensure security, that threat must be wholly destroyed. And that means war.

“War” is exactly how President Bush saw the attacks of 9/11, and it is exactly how the author of this article sees the Mumbai crisis today:

As a surprise attack became a 48-hour struggle, the burden of responding transferred from the police to soldiers. The language was of war: television anchors spoke of buildings “sanitized” and “flushed out,” of “final assaults” and “collateral damage.” Helicopters hovered over Mumbai, and commandos dropped onto roofs. The grainy television imagery suggested not so much a terrorist attack as the shapeless, omnidirectional chaos of Iraq.

The reference to Iraq is intriguing, because although the article draws the right comparison, it comes to the wrong conclusions. If anything, the experience of Iraq should have taught us how inadequate the “war” metaphor is for describing the work of anti-terrorism. As a term, “war” defines a purely military venture. But—and the new American strategy in Iraq backs this up—force is the not the only tool in the toolbox.

Terrorism is perhaps best pursued as a law-enforcement issue rather than a “war” issue. “Law-enforcement” implies extended time horizons and broad-based strategy, whereas “war” connotes a need for the swift destruction of “the enemy”—an artificial concept that assumes a finite number of hostiles. The non-military approach suggests a better capacity to operate patiently and flexibly on a multilateral basis, whereas a military’s ultimate job is simply to shoot things.

Don’t get me wrong. The military can be a very effective tool under a variety of conditions. But let’s not forget the other resources at our disposal. Let’s not forget that the “war” against terrorism is about more than body counts. Let’s not forget that, as tragic as the attack in India was, life will go on. We cannot live under a wartime mentality indefinitely. Just as we can’t allow our lives to be dominated by fear, so must we deny our fear the opportunity to define our responses to terrorism. I would argue that the U.S. failed in this respect, and the Indians are on the verge of making the same mistake, seven years later:

[India's mood was that] of a country that wanted [Mumbai] to be 9/11—if not in the sense of war and conquest, then in the sense of instant clarity, of the simple feeling that an era had ended.

Let’s not kid ourselves. It’s never that simple.