The difference between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism

Earlier, we spent some time parsing the White House’s new policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the truth is, no matter how explicit President Barack Obama’s expression of strategy is, there are profound disagreements over how that strategy should be implemented.

Obama can talk all he wants about how he hopes to “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return.” Yet the procedure for achieving those goals isn’t all that well defined.

There are really two ways to approach the fight against al-Qaeda: the counterinsurgency (COIN) method, and what many refer to as the counterterrorism (CT) method. At first glance, both terms appear to describe the same thing — which is the trap that the president is in danger of falling into.

Both philosophies overlap to a certain degree, but to paint a starker picture, I think the term “anti-terrorism” is more appropriate instead of CT. What distinguishes antiterrorism (call it “AT,” perhaps) from COIN? AT seeks to limit the effects of terrorism by thwarting attackers and preparing defenses, whereas COIN calls for neutralizing the incentives that encourage the spread of radicalism.

Recent U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has featured an increase in the use of UAV attacks and small-team strike forces killing groups of suspected insurgents. That’s a short-term strategy at best. Think of it this way: CT is best used as a tactic, not a strategy. Meanwhile, COIN is best used as a strategy, not a tactic. Put them together, and what should happen is the use of offensive tactics in the larger context of a campaign that seeks to disincentivize radicalism.

Trouble is, not enough people realize the difference between each approach.

Is America’s ‘AfPak’ policy still dominated by fear?

On Richard Holbrooke’s first trip to Lahore as President Obama’s new special envoy to the ‘AfPak’ region, the incisive diplomat is reported to have gotten straight to the point, asking his dinner companions: “What is the crisis of Pakistan?”

It would appear that the new administration is asking the right questions, but it remains to be seen whether or not they will pursue the right policies. The situation as it stands is highly unsustainable: Taliban forces have gained the upper hand in Afghanistan, signaled by the recent incursions of suicide bombers into Kabul, and just across the border, Pakistan is experiencing a Talibanisation of its own.

While it is still early, the Obama administration has only taken baby steps towards a new security approach, and its ‘AfPak’ policies are virtually indistinguishable from those of its predecessor. America’s regional tactics continue to bear the hallmarks of fear, rather than of initiative.

Fear of Fatalities

This week’s decision to send an additional 17,000 American troops to Afghanistan lends insight into the war-effort’s ailing conditions. More than this, however, the pithy number of reinforcements, coupled with a continued dependence on aerial bombing, represents a clear continuation of Bush II’s casualty-phobic policies.

It is no secret that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won on the fly; a winning strategy will require more boots on the ground, much higher levels of investment in development, and local arrangements with tribal leaders. Why, then, are we beating around the bush?

Fear of Inaction

In Pakistan, American strategy appears to be even more tactically misconceived. Fearful of inaction by the Pakistani government, the Obama administration is continuing to send unmanned drones into the borderlands to conduct air raids.

In the short-term, this method has proved highly successful in killing Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects. In the long-term, however, more Taliban suspects have emerged like the many-headed hydra, while high rates of civilian casualties increase local resentment, and facilitate Taliban expansion.

The Way Forward

The Obama administration is still in its early days, and the appointment of Richard Holbrooke is an encouraging development. But in order to win the Afghanistan war, and stem the tide of Pakistan’s Talibanisation, America must pen the enemy in the borderlands from two directions.

Such a strategy will require America to don a brave face, and shed its fear of fatalities and inaction — after all, history has taught us that sacrifices must be made by a country that stands for something.

In Afghanistan, this will mean more money and troops on the ground. In Pakistan, Obama must halt drone activity, which has only contributed to the further alienation of President Zardari’s civilian government. Instead, America must aim to prop up President Zardari’s civilian government against malignant forces in the army and intelligence services. In both cases, America must implement a discerning strategy involving both hard and soft power.

With American pressure from the West, and Pakistani pressure from the East, the Taliban will be on the run.

Extra soldiers help, but it’s the strategy that counts

A new report from the NYT tells us more of what we already know: that the military situation in Afghanistan is deadlocked until the U.S. and its NATO allies can get more troops to the region.

The commanders here call the current situation “stalemate,” meaning they can hold what they have but cannot do much else. Of the 20,000 British, American and other troops here, only roughly 300 — a group of British Royal Marines — can be moved around the region to strike the Taliban. All the other units must stay where they are, lest the area they hold slip from their grasp.

Vast swaths of the border remain unpatrolled and completely open. The drug trade is as lucrative as ever. But things should start looking up soon. More important than the extra 20,000 soldiers that will be deployed to Afghanistan is the strategy Western forces have come to adopt.

American commanders say the extra troops will better enable them to pursue a more sophisticated campaign against the insurgents; the overriding objective, rather than killing Taliban fighters, is to provide security for the civilian population and thereby isolate the insurgents.