Nervy arguments, indeed

Thomas Ricks’ “The Best Defense” blog highlights new, “nervy” arguments made by Colin Gray. The article, which appeared in the latest issue of Parameters (the U.S. Army War College’s quarterly magazine) claims the following:

1. A war between the U.S. and China is “quite likely.”
2. People fret about terrorism the same way that Chicken Little worried about the sky falling. “Compared to interstate war, terrorism … is a minor menace.”
3. “NATO-Russian relations are an accident waiting to happen.”

Gutsy indeed. I think Gray is wrong on all counts. Maybe I’m overly idealistic, but I just can’t see it happening. Yes, China’s growing cyberwarfare capabilities are a threat to U.S. security, and the two countries differ over issues of development and human rights. But I’m not convinced those differences outweigh our similarities (read: both countries just want to get rich). China’s politics may differ from America’s, but that’s not to say they’re necessarily in direct competition.

John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, one of the nation’s foremost counterinsurgency thinkers and a senior fellow at CNAS, has argued that the U.S. military has given up only about three percent of its conventional warfighting capability — for a 300 percent increase in its capacity to fight unconventional wars. Even if interstate war is really more important than low-intensity conflict, the U.S. is still more than prepared for a conventional fight. And the payoff we’ve had from redirecting our resources to learn about unconventional warfare have been massive, enough to make them a valuable pursuit in themselves.

NATO’s recent olive branch extended to Russia suggests relations are improving, not worsening. Despite the historically tense ties between the alliance and Moscow, I don’t think a Russia-NATO partnership is out of the question. If NATO can get Russia to become a net security provider instead of a security liability (maybe even bring Russia on board as a member!) that will mean huge gains for European and Asian security. And that would be a bonus for NATO, who’s looking to justify its relevance in the post-Cold War age. A bonus, too, for Russia — they get to be part of the club that all the popular countries are in. Everybody wins.

Kyrgyzstan just asked the U.S. military to leave. Does that work to Russia’s interest?

Source: http://video.nytimes.com/video/2009/02/04/world/asia/1231547102124/us-troops-out-of-kyrgyzstan-.html

By now, you’ve probably found out that the government of Kyrgyzstan wants to kick the U.S. out of the country. If you  haven’t — well, you heard it here first.

It’s a big deal when any country asks the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world to leave. But the strategic location of Kyrgyzstan makes this particular request especially problematic for the U.S.

The American air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, lies within striking distance of Afghanistan. It serves as the logistics hub for everything related to the U.S. mission against the Taliban. From cargo shipments to tanker refueling, the Manas air base is central to the U.S. military.

There are signs that Moscow may have had a hand in the incident. It’s in preliminary negotiations with Washington about putting the air base somewhere in Russia — this, just after Russia agreed to loan Kyrgyzstan a large sum of money.

The hullaballoo over Kyrgyzstan raises some important questions: did Kyrgyzstan decide to force the U.S. out as a result of the loan? And did Russia make the loan intending for that to happen? If so, the follow-up: did Russia simply want to disrupt American operations in Afghanistan, or did it want something else? The U.S. to relocate the base within Russia’s own borders, perhaps, given the ongoing negotiations? And the follow-up to all of that: why??

I don’t profess to know the answer to all these questions. But while I try to find out, here’s a video from the New York Times to hold you over. It’s about life in Manas — the kind that you don’t normally hear about on the wires.

U.S. extends the olive branch on missile defense, but will Russia take it?

Source: http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/j/msnbc/Components/Photo_StoryLevel/071218/071218-missile-defense-vmed-915a.widec.jpg

The U.S. signaled its openness to negotiate with Russia on plans for missile defense in eastern Europe yesterday, WaPo reports. Negotiations would be incumbent upon Russia’s willingness to support Western policy with respect to Iran.

Remember how Russia and China are key players in any dealings over Iran’s nuclear program? This gives Russia an easy out. The prospect of a U.S. compromise on missile defense should look pretty attractive to Moscow. But the question now is, how dangerous would an American missile shield be to Russian interests, and would that threat be significant enough such that Russia would see more benefit in negotiating with the U.S. than reducing its support for Iran?

Since I’m not sure just how committed Moscow is to the missile defense issue, it’s hard for me to say whether Russia will take the bait. Even though U.S.-Russia relations have been slightly chilly in the past couple years, nothing jumps out at me that suggests armed hostilities are in the pipeline. So it might be that Russia doesn’t, in fact, see missile defense as a sufficiently serious problem to merit bailing on Iran — especially if it perceives the Obama administration as one that won’t try and take advantage of Russia.

The top 5 Iran variables facing the Obama administration

Looking at the news coming out of Iran, it’s hard to know where things stand. Will U.S.-Iranian relations improve in the coming months, or will they sour? Here are the key variables (in no particular order) that will likely determine the outcome of the equation:

1. President Obama. Obama’s election has elicited an immense outpouring of goodwill on the part of the U.S.’s European allies, and has even gotten Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to crack open his shell. Obama has repeatedly signaled his willingness to renew U.S.-Iranian dialogue, from his inaugural speech (“unclench your fist“) to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s observation that “as we look at the opportunities available to us, we are going to have a very broad survey of what we think we can do.” At the same time, Obama has also made clear that he’s not afraid of applying pressure if necessary.
2. European commitment. With what seems like a friendlier White House, Europeans appear to be (slightly) more willing to press Iran again on its weapons development program. This is exactly the subject that U.S. officials are going to discuss with European leaders, starting tomorrow. It’s still unclear whether Europe will go along with Obama. Here’s my educated guess: they’ll stick with him as long as there is a reasonable chance of success. But should things stumble slightly, I think they’ll spook. Why? Well, here’s what the NYT said, according to European diplomats: “France, Britain and Germany might be willing to consider sanctions if the Obama administration makes an effort to improve the atmosphere with Iran first.” Decoded, it sounds like those nations are willing to let Obama do the dirty work, and if relations improve, then no sanctions will be necessary and Europe will be off the hook. And if relations fail to improve, then Europe can simply say Obama didn’t try hard enough and that he should work more. So far, I’m skeptical that Europe is truly invested in this.
   

   Source: http://patdollard.com/wp-content/uploads/light_up_big.jpg

3. Iranian weapons technology. Despite last year’s National Intelligence Estimate that proved the Bush administration wrong on Iran, all indications are that Tehran will eventually figure out how to build a nuclear weapon if the West does nothing. Iran launched its first space satellite today, according to various sources. The missile technology that lofted the satellite was, according to French officials, “very similar” to ballistic missile technology and could lead to the production of just such a weapons-delivery system. As Iranian technology improves, pressure will increase upon Western nations (and especially on Obama) to find a solution. The closer Iran gets to an MRBM or ICBM, the less pretty that solution will turn out to be.
4. Iranian politics. Iran will be holding its next set of presidential elections this June. Rumors are circulating that Mohammad Khatami, the “moderate former Iranian president,” may announce his candidacy. “So far,” Passport quips, “[Khatami] hasn’t announced squat.” Whatever the outcome of that situation, this year’s elections should prove vitally important to the way the U.S. approaches the Iranian problem overall. Obama will have to interpret all of Ahmedinejad’s reelection contortions, for one. For another, if Khatami or another individual gets voted into office, that would drastically change the terms of the discussion. Obama might have more influence with someone like Khatami. But then again, if Ahmedinejad gets reelected (which I think is likely), we’re back to square one. With the stake a little higher.
5. Russia and China. Both have significant interests in Iran, and both have opposed sanctions against Tehran in the past. Without their support for Western efforts, it’ll be tough trying to get anything done, whether that means showing them the carrot or the stick.

What other factors do you think will shape the outcome of the drama over Iran?

[UPDATE]: The United Arab Emirates has just agreed to accept the U.S.’s help in creating a nuclear energy program that cannot be converted for weapons-development purposes, reports the IHT. If this succeeds, it could set a precedent and provide a possible solution to Iran. Iran won’t like hearing it, but if its intention is to truly create a peaceful nuclear electricity infrastructure, then it has no good reason to reject this option. Rebuffing the UAE path is only likely to raise Western suspicions about ulterior Iranian motives even more.

A prime opportunity

As Russia aims for a more “conciliatory tone” regarding its relationship with the West, the U.S. and its allies should take advantage of the gesture to repair the link, rather than continue applying belligerent rhetoric and diplomatic pressure. Bringing the Russians closer to NATO would reduce the likelihood of armed conflict between the two parties, thereby addressing the regional security vacuum that’s now leaving many smaller countries worried.