Tehran’s and Washington’s interests aren’t mutually exclusive

The Obama administration today announced that it would drop a key precondition for negotiations with Iran — a precondition that the Bush administration had insisted on maintaining, says the NYT.

The theory is that by allowing Tehran to continue enriching uranium for an as-yet unspecified length of time during talks, the country will have an incentive to negotiate. “We are going to start with some interim steps,” said an unnamed European official, “to build a little trust.”

Source: http://www.abc.net.au/reslib/200804/r240208_972753.jpg

But Obama’s concession doesn’t fundamentally change the cost-benefit analysis for Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Certainly, from his perspective, keeping the enrichment facilities up and running as long as possible is in Iran’s interest. But if the outcome is still going to be that Tehran gives up its nuclear programs, you can bet that Ahmedinejad will do everything he can to sabotage the process.

What we need is a solution that’s mutually agreeable. Iran’s goal is to keep its nuclear facilities. Westerners don’t want Tehran to build a bomb. These aren’t mutually exclusive objectives. Yes, it’s difficult to implement effective oversight, and it’s not that far a jump from civilian nuclear energy to something more dangerous. But the hardest part is coming to a satisfactory agreement in the first place. Everything after should be a piece of cake by comparison.

A middle-ground solution would be to do what the U.S. recently did with the United Arab Emirates: sign a cooperative nuclear treaty that would see American technology exported to the Middle East. Done this way, Ahmedinejad gets to keep his nuclear energy program, and the U.S. gets to keep track of every piece of equipment that goes over there. Periodic, perhaps random maintenance checks, would also give Obama an opportunity to oversee what’s happening.

The danger that Ahmedinejad might co-opt even this program into producing enriched uranium is not nonexistent. But risk management, while more difficult, is also more realistic than the inflexibility of risk avoidance.

U.S. extends the olive branch on missile defense, but will Russia take it?

Source: http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/j/msnbc/Components/Photo_StoryLevel/071218/071218-missile-defense-vmed-915a.widec.jpg

The U.S. signaled its openness to negotiate with Russia on plans for missile defense in eastern Europe yesterday, WaPo reports. Negotiations would be incumbent upon Russia’s willingness to support Western policy with respect to Iran.

Remember how Russia and China are key players in any dealings over Iran’s nuclear program? This gives Russia an easy out. The prospect of a U.S. compromise on missile defense should look pretty attractive to Moscow. But the question now is, how dangerous would an American missile shield be to Russian interests, and would that threat be significant enough such that Russia would see more benefit in negotiating with the U.S. than reducing its support for Iran?

Since I’m not sure just how committed Moscow is to the missile defense issue, it’s hard for me to say whether Russia will take the bait. Even though U.S.-Russia relations have been slightly chilly in the past couple years, nothing jumps out at me that suggests armed hostilities are in the pipeline. So it might be that Russia doesn’t, in fact, see missile defense as a sufficiently serious problem to merit bailing on Iran — especially if it perceives the Obama administration as one that won’t try and take advantage of Russia.

Who do Iranians really want at the head of their country?

FP passes on a report from the Times of London: “Khatami was attacked by a mob in Tehran…”

The candidate escaped as critics and supporters clashed. If this is what Iran is going to look like in the next couple months, the U.S. should prepare itself for some rough waters ahead.

A Khatami resurgence?

Mohammed Khatami has announced he’s running for president of Iran.

No word yet on whether Mahmoud Ahmedinejad will try to block Khatami’s presidency. The elections will be held on June 12.

The top 5 Iran variables facing the Obama administration

Looking at the news coming out of Iran, it’s hard to know where things stand. Will U.S.-Iranian relations improve in the coming months, or will they sour? Here are the key variables (in no particular order) that will likely determine the outcome of the equation:

1. President Obama. Obama’s election has elicited an immense outpouring of goodwill on the part of the U.S.’s European allies, and has even gotten Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to crack open his shell. Obama has repeatedly signaled his willingness to renew U.S.-Iranian dialogue, from his inaugural speech (“unclench your fist“) to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s observation that “as we look at the opportunities available to us, we are going to have a very broad survey of what we think we can do.” At the same time, Obama has also made clear that he’s not afraid of applying pressure if necessary.
2. European commitment. With what seems like a friendlier White House, Europeans appear to be (slightly) more willing to press Iran again on its weapons development program. This is exactly the subject that U.S. officials are going to discuss with European leaders, starting tomorrow. It’s still unclear whether Europe will go along with Obama. Here’s my educated guess: they’ll stick with him as long as there is a reasonable chance of success. But should things stumble slightly, I think they’ll spook. Why? Well, here’s what the NYT said, according to European diplomats: “France, Britain and Germany might be willing to consider sanctions if the Obama administration makes an effort to improve the atmosphere with Iran first.” Decoded, it sounds like those nations are willing to let Obama do the dirty work, and if relations improve, then no sanctions will be necessary and Europe will be off the hook. And if relations fail to improve, then Europe can simply say Obama didn’t try hard enough and that he should work more. So far, I’m skeptical that Europe is truly invested in this.
   

   Source: http://patdollard.com/wp-content/uploads/light_up_big.jpg

3. Iranian weapons technology. Despite last year’s National Intelligence Estimate that proved the Bush administration wrong on Iran, all indications are that Tehran will eventually figure out how to build a nuclear weapon if the West does nothing. Iran launched its first space satellite today, according to various sources. The missile technology that lofted the satellite was, according to French officials, “very similar” to ballistic missile technology and could lead to the production of just such a weapons-delivery system. As Iranian technology improves, pressure will increase upon Western nations (and especially on Obama) to find a solution. The closer Iran gets to an MRBM or ICBM, the less pretty that solution will turn out to be.
4. Iranian politics. Iran will be holding its next set of presidential elections this June. Rumors are circulating that Mohammad Khatami, the “moderate former Iranian president,” may announce his candidacy. “So far,” Passport quips, “[Khatami] hasn’t announced squat.” Whatever the outcome of that situation, this year’s elections should prove vitally important to the way the U.S. approaches the Iranian problem overall. Obama will have to interpret all of Ahmedinejad’s reelection contortions, for one. For another, if Khatami or another individual gets voted into office, that would drastically change the terms of the discussion. Obama might have more influence with someone like Khatami. But then again, if Ahmedinejad gets reelected (which I think is likely), we’re back to square one. With the stake a little higher.
5. Russia and China. Both have significant interests in Iran, and both have opposed sanctions against Tehran in the past. Without their support for Western efforts, it’ll be tough trying to get anything done, whether that means showing them the carrot or the stick.

What other factors do you think will shape the outcome of the drama over Iran?

[UPDATE]: The United Arab Emirates has just agreed to accept the U.S.’s help in creating a nuclear energy program that cannot be converted for weapons-development purposes, reports the IHT. If this succeeds, it could set a precedent and provide a possible solution to Iran. Iran won’t like hearing it, but if its intention is to truly create a peaceful nuclear electricity infrastructure, then it has no good reason to reject this option. Rebuffing the UAE path is only likely to raise Western suspicions about ulterior Iranian motives even more.