U.S.-led ambush strikes a positive note in Afghanistan

Source: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2009/04/17/world/ 17afghan2_600.JPG

A New York Times reporter recounts the story of a one-sided ambush in Afghanistan — this time launched by U.S. forces:

Lieutenant Smith was new to the platoon. This was his fourth patrol. He was in a situation that every infantry lieutenant trains for, but almost no infantry lieutenant ever sees. “Fire,” he said, softly into the radio. “Fire. Fire. Fire.”

The platoon’s frontage exploded with noise and flashes of light as soldiers fired. Bullets struck all of the lead Taliban fighters, the soldiers said. The first Afghans fell where they were hit, not managing to fire a single shot.

This doesn’t say much about the overall strategic situation in Afghanistan, but it’s pretty uplifting to see certain things going well. It’s also a great story.

The difference between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism

Earlier, we spent some time parsing the White House’s new policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the truth is, no matter how explicit President Barack Obama’s expression of strategy is, there are profound disagreements over how that strategy should be implemented.

Obama can talk all he wants about how he hopes to “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return.” Yet the procedure for achieving those goals isn’t all that well defined.

There are really two ways to approach the fight against al-Qaeda: the counterinsurgency (COIN) method, and what many refer to as the counterterrorism (CT) method. At first glance, both terms appear to describe the same thing — which is the trap that the president is in danger of falling into.

Both philosophies overlap to a certain degree, but to paint a starker picture, I think the term “anti-terrorism” is more appropriate instead of CT. What distinguishes antiterrorism (call it “AT,” perhaps) from COIN? AT seeks to limit the effects of terrorism by thwarting attackers and preparing defenses, whereas COIN calls for neutralizing the incentives that encourage the spread of radicalism.

Recent U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has featured an increase in the use of UAV attacks and small-team strike forces killing groups of suspected insurgents. That’s a short-term strategy at best. Think of it this way: CT is best used as a tactic, not a strategy. Meanwhile, COIN is best used as a strategy, not a tactic. Put them together, and what should happen is the use of offensive tactics in the larger context of a campaign that seeks to disincentivize radicalism.

Trouble is, not enough people realize the difference between each approach.

Some of us still don’t get the message about counterinsurgency

In the wake of an investigation into a July 13 gun battle in Afghanistan that left nine U.S. soldiers dead and 27 wounded, Thomas Ricks offers this potential lesson for would-be counterinsurgency leaders:

Counterinsurgency can’t be conducted piecemeal. You are either doing the full-court press — or you are not doing counterinsurgency. Just dropping troops into a hostile neighborhood is not COIN.

The local battalion commander didn’t realize that, Ricks says, and crticizes him for trying to “leapfrog” into the area.

True counterinsurgency requires a broad-based strategy, using not just military force (hard power) but also diplomacy (soft), infrastructure construction (soft) and rapport-building with the local population (soft).

Extra soldiers help, but it’s the strategy that counts

A new report from the NYT tells us more of what we already know: that the military situation in Afghanistan is deadlocked until the U.S. and its NATO allies can get more troops to the region.

The commanders here call the current situation “stalemate,” meaning they can hold what they have but cannot do much else. Of the 20,000 British, American and other troops here, only roughly 300 — a group of British Royal Marines — can be moved around the region to strike the Taliban. All the other units must stay where they are, lest the area they hold slip from their grasp.

Vast swaths of the border remain unpatrolled and completely open. The drug trade is as lucrative as ever. But things should start looking up soon. More important than the extra 20,000 soldiers that will be deployed to Afghanistan is the strategy Western forces have come to adopt.

American commanders say the extra troops will better enable them to pursue a more sophisticated campaign against the insurgents; the overriding objective, rather than killing Taliban fighters, is to provide security for the civilian population and thereby isolate the insurgents.