Nervy arguments, indeed

Thomas Ricks’ “The Best Defense” blog highlights new, “nervy” arguments made by Colin Gray. The article, which appeared in the latest issue of Parameters (the U.S. Army War College’s quarterly magazine) claims the following:

1. A war between the U.S. and China is “quite likely.”
2. People fret about terrorism the same way that Chicken Little worried about the sky falling. “Compared to interstate war, terrorism … is a minor menace.”
3. “NATO-Russian relations are an accident waiting to happen.”

Gutsy indeed. I think Gray is wrong on all counts. Maybe I’m overly idealistic, but I just can’t see it happening. Yes, China’s growing cyberwarfare capabilities are a threat to U.S. security, and the two countries differ over issues of development and human rights. But I’m not convinced those differences outweigh our similarities (read: both countries just want to get rich). China’s politics may differ from America’s, but that’s not to say they’re necessarily in direct competition.

John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, one of the nation’s foremost counterinsurgency thinkers and a senior fellow at CNAS, has argued that the U.S. military has given up only about three percent of its conventional warfighting capability — for a 300 percent increase in its capacity to fight unconventional wars. Even if interstate war is really more important than low-intensity conflict, the U.S. is still more than prepared for a conventional fight. And the payoff we’ve had from redirecting our resources to learn about unconventional warfare have been massive, enough to make them a valuable pursuit in themselves.

NATO’s recent olive branch extended to Russia suggests relations are improving, not worsening. Despite the historically tense ties between the alliance and Moscow, I don’t think a Russia-NATO partnership is out of the question. If NATO can get Russia to become a net security provider instead of a security liability (maybe even bring Russia on board as a member!) that will mean huge gains for European and Asian security. And that would be a bonus for NATO, who’s looking to justify its relevance in the post-Cold War age. A bonus, too, for Russia — they get to be part of the club that all the popular countries are in. Everybody wins.

The top 5 Iran variables facing the Obama administration

Looking at the news coming out of Iran, it’s hard to know where things stand. Will U.S.-Iranian relations improve in the coming months, or will they sour? Here are the key variables (in no particular order) that will likely determine the outcome of the equation:

1. President Obama. Obama’s election has elicited an immense outpouring of goodwill on the part of the U.S.’s European allies, and has even gotten Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to crack open his shell. Obama has repeatedly signaled his willingness to renew U.S.-Iranian dialogue, from his inaugural speech (“unclench your fist“) to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s observation that “as we look at the opportunities available to us, we are going to have a very broad survey of what we think we can do.” At the same time, Obama has also made clear that he’s not afraid of applying pressure if necessary.
2. European commitment. With what seems like a friendlier White House, Europeans appear to be (slightly) more willing to press Iran again on its weapons development program. This is exactly the subject that U.S. officials are going to discuss with European leaders, starting tomorrow. It’s still unclear whether Europe will go along with Obama. Here’s my educated guess: they’ll stick with him as long as there is a reasonable chance of success. But should things stumble slightly, I think they’ll spook. Why? Well, here’s what the NYT said, according to European diplomats: “France, Britain and Germany might be willing to consider sanctions if the Obama administration makes an effort to improve the atmosphere with Iran first.” Decoded, it sounds like those nations are willing to let Obama do the dirty work, and if relations improve, then no sanctions will be necessary and Europe will be off the hook. And if relations fail to improve, then Europe can simply say Obama didn’t try hard enough and that he should work more. So far, I’m skeptical that Europe is truly invested in this.
   

   Source: http://patdollard.com/wp-content/uploads/light_up_big.jpg

3. Iranian weapons technology. Despite last year’s National Intelligence Estimate that proved the Bush administration wrong on Iran, all indications are that Tehran will eventually figure out how to build a nuclear weapon if the West does nothing. Iran launched its first space satellite today, according to various sources. The missile technology that lofted the satellite was, according to French officials, “very similar” to ballistic missile technology and could lead to the production of just such a weapons-delivery system. As Iranian technology improves, pressure will increase upon Western nations (and especially on Obama) to find a solution. The closer Iran gets to an MRBM or ICBM, the less pretty that solution will turn out to be.
4. Iranian politics. Iran will be holding its next set of presidential elections this June. Rumors are circulating that Mohammad Khatami, the “moderate former Iranian president,” may announce his candidacy. “So far,” Passport quips, “[Khatami] hasn’t announced squat.” Whatever the outcome of that situation, this year’s elections should prove vitally important to the way the U.S. approaches the Iranian problem overall. Obama will have to interpret all of Ahmedinejad’s reelection contortions, for one. For another, if Khatami or another individual gets voted into office, that would drastically change the terms of the discussion. Obama might have more influence with someone like Khatami. But then again, if Ahmedinejad gets reelected (which I think is likely), we’re back to square one. With the stake a little higher.
5. Russia and China. Both have significant interests in Iran, and both have opposed sanctions against Tehran in the past. Without their support for Western efforts, it’ll be tough trying to get anything done, whether that means showing them the carrot or the stick.

What other factors do you think will shape the outcome of the drama over Iran?

[UPDATE]: The United Arab Emirates has just agreed to accept the U.S.’s help in creating a nuclear energy program that cannot be converted for weapons-development purposes, reports the IHT. If this succeeds, it could set a precedent and provide a possible solution to Iran. Iran won’t like hearing it, but if its intention is to truly create a peaceful nuclear electricity infrastructure, then it has no good reason to reject this option. Rebuffing the UAE path is only likely to raise Western suspicions about ulterior Iranian motives even more.

Pirates’ timbers shiver as China announces naval mission in Gulf of Aden

The Chinese government plans to dispatch two navy warships to the Somali coast in a new anti-piracy mission, reports the IHT.

Though the naval vessels will be mainly concerned with protecting Chinese shipping, U.S. and European naval commanders are already calling for coordination with China on the issue. This is a good sign—even if the Chinese are being motivated primarily by their own interests, it’s a step towards making China a global security provider.

China’s aircraft carrier ambitions are worrisome, but only if you lose perspective

China’s designs to upgrade its military capabilities have thus far been fairly open. There are a lot of things we know about the People’s Liberation Army. It’s making extensive preparations for cyberwarfare. It’s developed and deployed its own AWACS radar aircraft. And its standard-issue infantry weapons underwent complete redesign in 1995.

Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/images/type-98_pic1.jpg

But there’s also a lot we don’t know, specifically about Chinese plans for the future. Any real hints we may get will likely come from the PLA itself. Take the country’s tightly-guarded development plans for a Chinese aircraft carrier, for example: high-level officials wouldn’t talk specifics on Monday, but did leave room for speculation about China’s interest in such a system. The story, which first appeared in the Financial Times, has China observers all in a tizzy. Proof of the program’s existence, they say, would confirm the PRC’s aspirations for regional dominance.

Well, duh.

The lesson is not that the expansion of China’s military capabilities necessarily represents a threat, but that we’re simply seeing the result of a modernization campaign that would place the PLA on about the same technical level as, say, the European militaries. After all, reports the IHT, “Of the handful of other nations [besides the U.S.] that have aircraft carriers, including Britain, France, Italy and Russia, none has more than two.” Until recently, the Chinese military has focused on manpower as the key game-changer in warfare (as evidenced by its 2.25 million-strong army) but the developments of the past decade or so make it clear that the PLA’s priorities are coming to resemble those of its more up-to-date counterparts. Seen in that light, if the PLA can be convinced to become a net security provider like those counterparts rather than a destabilizer, its modernization campaign actually begins to look like a good thing.

Our debt to the Chinese (and theirs to us)

FP’s Passport blog underscores just how interconnected the Chinese and American economies really are.

It would be enough that the Chinese own the second-most United States’ treasury bonds of any foreign nation (about $518 billion as of July). Almost certainly, if the bail out goes forward, that number will rise.

While expanding the debt to China could give Beijing dangerous leverage over Washington, the country’s elite realizes that if the U.S. tanks, so do they. So they’re understandably being careful with the economic relationship. And given that’s the case, there’s good reason to believe they’ll extend that caution to the political sphere, too.